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The primary goal of this study was to investigate the mediating role of mind 
wandering in the relationship between working memory capacity (WMC) and reading 
comprehension as predicted by the executive-attention theory of WMC (e.g., Kane & 
Engle, 2003). I used a latent-variable, structural-equation-model approach with three 
WMC span tasks, seven reading comprehension tasks, and three attention-restraint tasks. 
Mind wandering was assessed using experimenter-scheduled thought probes during four 
different tasks. The results support the executive-attention theory of WMC. Mind 
wandering is a significant mediator in the relationship between WMC and reading 
comprehension, suggesting that the relationship is driven, in part, by attention control 
over intruding thoughts. I discuss implications for theories of WMC, attention control, 
and reading comprehension. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Mind wandering, a universal aspect of human experience, is defined as a shift of 
attention away from stimuli and mental representations associated with a person’s 
current-task goals to the consideration of task-unrelated thoughts (TUTs). Not all 
instances of attention to internal stimuli are considered mind wandering. For example, 
deliberate retrieval from long term memory, or generating imagery as a part of a task, are 
not mind wandering. In contrast, daydreaming during a class lecture, zoning out while 
reading, or contemplating evening plans while driving home are all examples of mind 
wandering, or task-unrelated thought.  
The prevalence and pervasiveness of mind wandering makes it important to 
psychologists attempting to understand the processes that govern human thought and 
behavior. Previous research indicates that, on average, people spend 30-40% of their time 
in this mind-wandering state (Kane, Brown, et al., 2007; Klinger & Cox, 1987; Singer, 
1975). Furthermore, mind wandering has been implicated in current-task performance 
deficits (e.g., McVay & Kane, 2009), including deficits in reading comprehension (e.g., 
Schooler, Reichle, & Halpern, 2004). 
The main goal of the current study was to investigate mind wandering as a 
mediator in the relationship between working memory capacity (WMC) and reading
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 comprehension. WMC, an individual-differences variable reflecting executive aspects of 
attention, predicts performance on a number of cognitive tasks ranging from simple 
attention restraint tasks (e.g., antisaccade; Stroop) to complex tasks (e.g., fluid reasoning; 
reading comprehension). The executive-attention view of WMC posits the control of 
attention as one important mechanism underlying performance on both WMC tasks and 
reading comprehension. Furthermore, I predicted that lapses of control over attention 
(i.e., mind wandering experiences) would be partially responsible for reading-
comprehension deficits. That is, individuals with lower WMC have greater deficits in 
reading comprehension in part because they are unable to keep their thoughts on-task. 
Task-unrelated thoughts displace the task goal of comprehending the reading material 
and disrupt a person’s ability to process the relevant details of the text for 
comprehension. I will discuss the relevant literature on mind wandering, WMC, and their 
connection to reading comprehension before addressing the specific aims and predictions 
for the current study. 
How is mind wandering studied? 
The systematic exploration of mind wandering necessitates an objective method 
for measuring subjective experience. Many studies (e.g., Giambra, 1993; Greenwald & 
Harder, 1995; Tang & Singer, 1997) have used scales to measure general tendencies to 
daydream or frequencies of cognitive failures, such as the Imaginal Processes Inventory 
(Singer & Antrobus, 1970). These global self-report measures are interesting as 
individual-difference variables but they are not sufficient to isolate cognitive, task, and 
contextual variables affecting mind wandering in a particular situation. Furthermore, 
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global reports are subject to bias and inaccuracies as a result of their retrospective nature. 
In-the-moment reports of mind wandering allow researchers to explore the ostensible 
relationship between TUTs and ongoing task performance. In their seminal paper, 
Antrobus, Singer, and Greenberg (1966) asked subjects to indicate, at the end of each 
trial block of a vigilance task, whether they had experienced any mind wandering. This 
trial-by-trial assessment of TUTs provided a new tool—the “thought probe”—to the field. 
When probing subjects for thought content, task interruptions should be 
minimized to maintain the integrity of both the task and thought content. Unfortunately, 
some researchers have asked subjects to report the contents of their thoughts out loud at 
the probe signal, to be transcribed and coded later for relatedness to the ongoing task 
(Parks, Klinger, & Perlmutter, 1988-89; Smallwood, Obonsawin, & Reid, 2003; 
Smallwood, Obonsawin, Reid, & Heim, 2002; Smallwood, O’Connor, Sudberry, & 
Ballantyre, 2004; Teasdale, Lloyd, Proctor, & Baddeley, 1993; Teasdale et al., 1995). 
This method is problematic in two ways: it interrupts the flow of the task for too long and 
it forces subjects to verbalize an experience that may not be easily to put into words 
(Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; see also Ericsson & Simon, 1980). A mind-wandering episode 
may only contain images or incomplete thoughts, making it necessary for the subject to 
fill in details for coherence or even to refrain from reporting the thought at all. This type 
of “verbalization” probe often results in particularly low frequencies of mind wandering. 
In contrast, binary responses to probes, which ask subjects some form of the 
question “Are you mind wandering?”’ with a yes or no response choice (Antrobus, 1968; 
Antrobus, Coleman, & Singer, 1967; Antrobus et al., 1966; Antrobus, Singer, Goldstein, 
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& Fortgang, 1970; Giambra, 1995; Mason et al., 2007; McKiernan, D’Angelo, Kaufman, 
& Binder, 2006; Schooler et al., 2004; Shaw & Giambra,1993), do not interrupt the task 
for more than a few seconds (e.g., M = 1555 ms in McKiernan et al., 2006). The cost of 
using such binary responses, however, is that they do not allow for assessment of other 
types of cognitive interference during tasks, such as self-evaluative thoughts about task 
performance (sometimes called “task-related interference”; Smallwood & Schooler, 
2006). A simple way around these costs is to use probes that allow subjects to indicate a 
category for their thought, (e.g., “everyday stuff” or “personal worries”; Giambra, 
Belongie, & Rosenberg, 1994-95; Giambra, Rosenberg, Kasper, Yee, & Sack, 1988-89; 
McVay & Kane, 2009; Smallwood, McSpadden, & Schooler, 2007). Such categorical 
probes do not interrupt the task for very long (e.g., M = 2300 ms in McVay & Kane, 
2009) and provide more information about the subjective experience. In the current study, 
subjects were asked to categorize their thoughts at the time of the probe based on both 
task-relatedness and the temporal nature of the thought (past, present, future; e.g., Mason 
et al., 2007).  
Validity of Thought Reports 
The use of introspective self-report methods may raise concerns about validity of 
the measures. First, subjects may not respond honestly to probes if their thoughts are too 
complex, incomplete, or of a sensitive nature. One way to deal with this problem is to 
simplify the responses necessary to the probes (i.e., providing multiple-choice questions 
rather than asking for free descriptions of thoughts) so subjects do not feel pressure to 
reveal personal details or to generate coherent content from their thoughts. Second, 
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subjects may not recall the contents of their thoughts with clarity. To deal with this issue, 
researchers should avoid probes that rely heavily on retrospective memory, such as global 
assessments and questionnaires at the end of a task. Brief interruptions to the task that ask 
subjects to assess the immediate contents of their thoughts allow for an in-the-moment 
record of TUTs. 
Systematic variations in mind wandering frequency that co-occur with variation in 
theoretically-motivated task variables indicate that there is validity to self-reports of mind 
wandering. The frequency of mind wandering decreases with increased task complexity 
(Grodsky & Giambra, 1990; Teasdale et al., 1995), task difficulty (Antrobus et al., 1970; 
Filler & Giambra, 1973; McGuire, Paulesu, Frackowiak, Frith, 1996; McKiernan et al., 
2006; Smallwood et al., 2003; Teasdale et al., 1993), and motivation for high 
performance (Antrobus et al., 1966); the frequency of mind wandering increases with 
time on task (Antrobus et al., 1967; Antrobus et al., 1966; McVay & Kane, 2009; McVay 
& Kane, in prep; Smallwood et al., 2004; Smallwood, 2002, Smallwood, Heim, Riby, & 
Davies, 2005; Teasdale et al., 1995) and alcohol consumption (Finnigan, Schulze, & 
Smallwood, 2007; Sayette, Reichle, & Schooler, 2009). As well, individual differences in 
the propensity to mind wander in the laboratory appear to be stable over time and reliable 
across a variety of tasks (Giambra, 1995; Grodsky & Giambra, 1990; McVay, Kane, & 
Kwapil, 2009).  
The relationship between subjective reports of mind wandering and objective task 
performance measurements also validate the introspective measure. For example, intra-
individual variation in task reaction times is an objective indicator of attention fluctuation 
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that can be used to validate self-report measures. McVay and Kane (2009) found a 
relationship between the frequency of TUTs and variation in reaction times (r = .40) in a 
go/no-go, sustained attention task (i.e., SART). It is unlikely that subjects are monitoring 
and manipulating their overall reaction time variability throughout the task to somehow 
map onto their probe responses or vice versa. McVay and Kane (in prep) demonstrated a 
relationship between individuals’ longest RTs and their propensity to mind wander. The 
authors generated an individualized ex-Gaussian distribution (the normal curve with an 
exponential component) for the RTs of each subjects and isolated the τ parameter (the 
tail) to represent the degree to which an individual produced exceptionally long RTs 
(within their own distribution). Individuals with larger estimates of τ mind wandered 
more often than individuals who did not produce many long RTs (McVay & Kane, in 
prep). The authors use this finding to help explain the worst performance rule, whereby 
an individual’s longest reaction times are more predictive of their performance than their 
fastest or overall RTs, in terms of lapses of attention. An individual’s longest RTs may 
represent those trials on which the subject’s mind has wandered and thereby represent 
another example of the negative relationship between mind wandering and performance. 
Researchers are searching for additional objective markers of mind wandering, 
using eye tracking and other physiological measures in addition to observed behavior 
(Schooler & Smallwood, 2006). For example, Reichle, Reineberg, and Schooler (in press) 
presented eye-tracking data from reading that suggests that although participants continue 
to move their eyes in a forward motion across the page when they are mind wandering, 
they cease to make the specific saccades necessary for comprehension (e.g., making more 
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saccades to infrequent or less-predictable words in a sentence). Moreover, researchers 
have connected TUTs to activity in certain areas of the brain using neuroimaging 
technology (e.g., Riby, Smallwood, & Gunn, 2008). 
Neuroimaging studies have identified several regions of the brain implicated 
directly in mind wandering experiences, reinforcing the validity of subjective reports. 
These areas, labeled the “default mode network” (Raichle et al., 2001), generally show 
deactivations in activity when subjects shift from a rest state, a time period with no task 
to complete, to an attention-demanding or goal-driven activity. These deactivations are 
interpreted to mean that “something” is going on in the brain even when there is no 
explicit task to complete and that this “something” decreases when attention to a 
particular task is required. During “rest,” the mind is free to wander, whereas during a 
task, thoughts must be more constrained. Subjective experience, however, indicates that 
people do not stay fully tuned in to the task at hand (i.e., their mind wanders) and 
therefore it is important to look at the activity in these same areas in relation to the 
subjective experience of mind wandering (Mason et al., 2007; Mason, Bar, & Macrae, 
2008; McGuire et al., 1996; McKiernan et al., 2006).  
Indeed, several fMRI studies have demonstrated the relationship between rate of 
TUTs (measured during the task) and changes in activity in the default mode network 
(Christoff, Gordon, Smallwood, Smith, & Schooler, 2009; Mason et al., 2007; Mason et 
al., 2008; McKiernan et al., 2006). Most recently, Christoff and colleagues (2009) 
directly connected in-the-moment thought reports during a scanning session with the 
fMRI data. Participants performed a go/no-go task with periodic thought probes while in 
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the fMRI scanner. The researchers measured default network activity in the time interval 
just prior to each thought probe. They observed greater recruitment of the default network 
for off-task thought reports than on-task thought reports, confirming the role of the 
default network in mind-wandering episodes. 
Another potential criticism of thought probes is that social desirability and 
thought monitoring might reactively change the frequency of mind-wandering episodes 
(or the frequency of their reporting). For example, Filler and Giambra (1973) predicted 
that the expectation of thought probes would increase estimates of mind wandering 
during a vigilance task. In the study, Filler and Giambra varied when subjects were first 
asked about mind-wandering experiences (i.e., after the first, second, or third block of the 
ongoing task). Contrary to predictions, TUT reports decreased when subjects knew 
earlier about the thought probes. The findings suggested, perhaps, that subjects’ 
awareness of their mind wandering in the first block caused them to exert more executive 
control during the second block. Alternatively, awareness of their mind wandering in the 
first block may have caused subjects to monitor for it in the second block, thereby 
interrupting normal mind-wandering production. Mind-wandering researchers, therefore, 
should take note of a possible underestimation of TUTs using the probe technique. 
Mind Wandering and Performance Errors 
Mind wandering has the obvious potential to interfere with ongoing task 
performance to varying degrees, depending on the task requirements. For example, 
whereas task-unrelated thought during a lecture is likely to impair learning of the 
material, the same type of thoughts during a drive would not necessarily affect 
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performance because driving is a largely automatic process. Psychologists are primarily 
interested in mind wandering during tasks that require focused attention, because errors 
caused by those mental lapses can range from the bothersome (e.g., brushing one’s teeth 
twice) to the catastrophic (e.g., crashing an airplane). The study of why mind wandering 
occurs, when it occurs, may shed light on the task and individual-difference variables 
necessary for optimal task performance. The ability to accomplish a non-automatic task 
or to fulfill a complex goal fundamentally depends on maintaining attention to that task 
or goal. Even the most skilled athlete does not expect to perform well if she “can’t keep 
her head in the game.”  
 In fact, mind wandering has been connected to errors on many attention-
demanding tasks. The relationship between mind wandering and errors takes two forms: 
Some studies report a correlation between individual differences in mind wandering rates 
and performance (McVay & Kane, 2009; Smallwood et al., 2004; Smallwood et al., 
2003), whereas others report a within-subjects comparison showing a greater in-the-
moment likelihood of an error in conjunction with the report of a TUT than a report of 
on-task thinking (McVay & Kane, 2009; Schooler et al., 2004; Smallwood et al., 2007). 
For example, overall recall memory for words is negatively related to TUT rates at study 
(r = -.25; Ellis, Moore, Varner, Ottaway, & Becker,1997) and subjects who reported one 
or more TUTs while learning words performed worse than no-TUT subjects on the 
subsequent memory test (Smallwood et al., 2003).  
McVay and Kane (2009) found that mind wandering predicts in-the-moment 
errors on a Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART; Manly, Robertson, Galloway, 
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& Hawkins, 1999; Robertson, Manly, Andrade, Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997). The SART is 
a go/no-go task in which stimuli are presented rapidly (250 ms; 900 ms mask) and subject 
are instructed to respond to all stimuli except infrequent (11%) randomly-occurring target 
trials that differ on some dimension. Previous work demonstrated that SART 
performance is related to both global measures of Cognitive Failures (CFQ; Robertson et 
al., 1997) and end-of-trial thought reports (Smallwood et al., 2004). McVay and Kane 
(2009) used a version of the SART with word stimuli and thought probes following 
randomly occurring target trials. Subjects committed more errors on target trials where 
they reported off-task thinking (M = .58) than when they were on-task (M = .38). The 
deterioration in performance over time on the SART task paralleled the increase in mind 
wandering over the same period. Individual differences in subjects’ overall accuracy also 
correlated negatively with their TUT rate (r = -.37). Variation in reaction time to the 
frequent non-target trials, an index of general fluctuations in attention, shared a 
relationship with TUTs in this task (r = .40). McVay and Kane (in prep) replicated these 
findings in the standard SART condition (r = -.30 for TUTs and accuracy; r = .25 for 
TUTs and RT variability). 
McVay and Kane (2009) used evidence from mind wandering in the SART to 
argue that conscious thought affects performance by interrupting maintenance of the task 
goal. This claim, if true, should apply to all tasks that require executive control to stay 
“on-task.” Although SART is a useful tool for testing this hypothesis in the lab, it is not a 
task that people encounter in their daily lives. Reading, on the other hand, is fundamental 
to learning and communication throughout the lifespan. Starting in the early years of 
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elementary school, textbooks are used to convey information to children; by teenage 
years, students are required to learn class material almost entirely through reading. 
Reading is also a task during which most people have had mind wandering experiences, 
where their eyes continue to move across the page although they are no longer processing 
the written material (Schooler et al., 2004). Furthermore, reading is usually an integrative 
task. Whereas SART errors occur on a trial-by-trial basis and do not necessarily affect 
future trials, missing information during reading can affect overall comprehension of the 
material. For example, if while reading a scientific article, a reader zones out during the 
operational definition of one of the variables, she may find it difficult to interpret the 
results. 
Mind Wandering and Reading 
Although mind wandering during reading is an experience common to most 
people, little work has addressed how off-task thoughts affect comprehension of reading 
material. Giambra and Grodsky (1989, 1990) measured mind wandering during reading 
and demonstrated a stable propensity to mind wander over vigilance and reading tasks (r 
= .51). They did not, however, report comprehension measures for the reading tasks and 
thus, did not demonstrate the effect of mind wandering on reading comprehension. 
Reichle et al. (submitted; originally presented in Schooler et al., 2004) presented data 
from the only studies looking directly at the relationship between the performance aspect 
of reading (i.e., comprehension) and mind wandering. They reported three studies in 
which subjects read a portion of Tolstoy’s War and Peace and completed a reading 
comprehension test. While reading the excerpt on the computer screen, subjects were 
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asked to monitor their mind wandering and report any occurrences by pressing a key (i.e., 
self- caught mind wandering reports). Some subjects were also probed every 2-4 minutes 
following either a self-reported mind wandering experience or the last probe. The 
proportion of probes on which subjects reported mind wandering predicted overall 
reading comprehension accuracy (r = -.51 in E1; r = -.25 in E2) indicating that more 
mind wandering predicted of worse comprehension accuracy. In Experiment 2, 
comprehension questions followed directly after each self-report or probe-caught mind 
wandering episode. Subjects who reported mind wandering (either self-reported or probe 
caught) performed worse on comprehension questions directly following the report (M 
accuracy = .59) than did unprobed control subjects (M = .80).  
One major limitation of the Reichle et al. study is that the authors’ focus on meta-
awareness (i.e., monitoring the contents of conscious experience) affected their design for 
thought probes. The probes were contingent on self-reports of mind wandering in that 
they occurred 2-4 minutes after either the last self-caught report or the last probe. There 
were, therefore, different numbers of each type of mind wandering report for each 
subject. This makes the essential comparison of reading comprehension following on-
task reports versus following off-task reports difficult. The authors’ comparison of 
accuracy during off-task reports with accuracy of unprobed subjects assumes that the 
unprobed subjects were not mind wandering and is contrary to the argument that most 
people mind wander at some point (if not many points) during reading. The current study 
used only experimenter-scheduled probes, which occurred at certain points in the text or 
at specific time intervals. 
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In a third experiment from the same series, Reichle et al. (submitted) compared 
mind wandering in a vigilance task to mind wandering in a reading task. One potential 
criticism of their first two experiments is that poor readers mind wander just because they 
are poor readers and not because task-irrelevant thoughts are actually causal in disrupting 
reading comprehension. Rather, poor readers mind wander because they are already 
reading poorly. A relationship between mind wandering in a vigilance task and reading 
comprehension would strengthen the claim that individual differences in the ability to 
maintain on-task thinking contributes to comprehension performance. However, while 
Reichle et al. (submitted) replicated the finding of Grodsky and Giambra (1990), that 
mind wandering reports in a vigilance task are related to mind wandering reports in 
reading (r = .36, self-caught reports only), they did not report the crucial relationship 
between mind wandering in the vigilance task and comprehension performance. 
Therefore, the current study will provide a more conclusive study of mind wandering and 
reading comprehension by linking mind wandering during a variety of tasks to reading 
comprehension. 
Mind Wandering and Executive Control 
Mind wandering is connected to errors in a variety of tasks, but why? Several 
researchers have suggested that mind wandering is related to executive function, although 
there are different views on how TUTs and executive function are related. Smallwood 
and Schooler (2006) posit that mind wandering requires executive resources, primarily on 
the basis of two studies by Teasdale and colleagues. Teasdale et al. (1993, 1995) found 
that subjects reported fewer TUTs during a task than while sitting quietly, during tasks 
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with greater versus lesser memory load, during tasks with faster versus slower stimulus 
presentation rate, and during more versus less practiced tasks. Finally, subjects were 
worse at generating random patterns of numbers (an executive function task; Teasdale et 
al., 1995) when they reported mind wandering than when they reported on-task thoughts 
(Teasdale et al., 1995). Smallwood and Schooler (2006) view these findings as evidence 
for resource sharing between the tasks and mind wandering (i.e., fewer resources are 
available for mind wandering when completing tasks with executive control demands).  
An alternative explanation for the Teasdale findings, however, is that the 
engagement of executive control in the above situations prevented mind wandering in 
order to facilitate task performance. Mind wandering, by this view, can be conceptualized 
as reflecting a lapse of executive control, rather than a process that requires executive 
resources (“control failures × concerns” view; McVay & Kane, 2009; in press). In fact, 
mind wandering may be the subjective experience of allowing automatically generated 
thoughts from a continuous stream of thoughts to enter consciousness in an uncontrolled 
manner. The shared brain areas active during “rest,” arguably an unconstrained time 
period, and mind wandering support this view. Mind wandering that affects performance, 
therefore, reflects a break in the restraints imposed on the train of thought in order to 
focus on the task. 
Our view is that a failure to control attention underlies the relationship between 
mind wandering and performance errors (McVay & Kane, 2009; in press). Mind 
wandering is the subjective experience that accompanies a failure to properly maintain 
task goals when successful performance relies on goal maintenance. TUTs increase with 
15 
 
time on task, suggesting that maintaining on-task thoughts may be subject to fatigue. 
Other types of control failures, such as expression of stereotype biases (Richeson & 
Trawalter, 2005), are also subject to fatigue (see also Muraven & Baumeister, 2000; 
Schmeichel, 2007). More importantly, the propensity to mind wander varies with 
individual differences in working memory capacity (WMC), a measure of attention 
control (Engle & Kane, 2004; Kane & Engle, 2003). 
The executive-attention view of WMC explains the relationship between WMC 
span tests and complex cognition, such as language comprehension and reading, through 
a domain-general attentional-control mechanism – that is, individual differences in the 
control of attention underlie performance on both WMC span tests and complex cognitive 
tasks (Engle & Kane, 2004; Kane & Engle, 2003). WMC is measured using complex 
span tasks requiring subjects to maintain access to items in memory while processing 
new incoming information. For example, the operation span (Ospan) requires subjects to 
verify the solution to compound math equations as the processing task. Interpolated with 
the math problems, subjects see a sequence of letters to learn for an immediate memory 
test. The reading span (Rspan) shares the same memory task with Ospan (remembering 
individual letters) but requires subjects to verify whether sentences make sense for the 
processing task. In addition to complex cognitive tasks like general fluid intelligence, 
language learning, and scholastic achievement (Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 
1999; Kane et al., 2004; Kane, Hambrick, & Conway, 2005), WMC predicts performance 
on low-level attention tasks involving minimal memory demands, such as the antisaccade 
task (Kane, Bleckley, Conway, & Engle, 2001; Unsworth, Scrock, & Engle, 2004). This 
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task requires subjects to resist attentional capture from a flashed stimulus to accurately 
attend to a target presented in the opposite field of vision. People with high WMC better 
resist the automatic pull of the flashing distracter stimulus than people with low WMC. 
Evidence from tasks like these (for review, see Kane, Conway, et al., 2007) suggests that 
WMC is closely linked to attentional control. 
According to Engle and Kane (2004; Kane, Conway, Hambrick, & Engle, 2007) 
there are two components of executive attention that are related to WMC: goal 
maintenance and competition resolution. Goal maintenance is sustaining access to task-
relevant information in the face of interference from habit, distracters, or competing 
thoughts (i.e., mind wandering). Competition resolution deals with the interference 
associated with the particular trial stimulus. That is, even if the goal of the task is 
sufficiently maintained, there may still be variation in overcoming a stimulus-driven 
response on a trial-by-trial basis. The dual components of executive attention can also be 
discussed in terms of “proactive” and “reactive” processes (Braver, Gray, & Burgess, 
2007). Proactive processes are initiated prior to the need for control and are sustained 
until the completion of the task. Reactive processes are initiated on an as-needed basis in 
response to the conflict on a trial. These two processes are strategically allocated based 
on the expected demands of the task (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; 
Braver et al., 2007; Brown & Braver, 2005). If the subject anticipates the need for top-
down control in the task, goal maintenance processes will be initiated at the onset of 
stimuli and maintained throughout the task. Successful performance on many attention-
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demanding tasks relies on both components of executive attention (for exceptions, see 
Kane, Poole, Tuholski, & Engle, 2006). 
   Kane and Engle (2003) provided crucial evidence for the dual-component 
nature of executive attention. Using a Stroop paradigm, they manipulated the proportion 
of color-word congruency, such that in some cases the color words and hues matched 
most of the time and in other they were mostly incongruent. In a mostly incongruent 
version of the task, the goal of naming the color is reinforced on most trials because 
reading the word would lead to an incorrect response. In contrast, in a mostly congruent 
condition, the color naming goal is not reinforced and therefore must be endogenously 
maintained throughout the task. Two important span differences in the ability to maintain 
the task goal emerged in the mostly congruent Stroop task. High spans were more 
accurate than low spans on the infrequent incongruent trials, suggesting they were better 
maintaining the color naming goal without reinforcement. Furthermore, the low spans 
responded more quickly than high spans to the congruent trials, suggesting that low spans 
were reading the words (a faster, more habitual task) rather than naming the color on 
congruent trials (i.e., they were not maintaining access to the color-naming goal 
throughout the task). Variation in competition resolution, the second component of 
executive attention, should produce reaction time differences even in conditions where 
the goal is easily maintained (mostly incongruent condition). In fact, low spans were 
slower than high spans to respond accurately on incongruent Stroop trials suggesting that 
even when they were maintaining the color naming goal, they were having more 
difficulty resolving the stimulus-based conflict than high spans. 
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Mind Wandering and WMC 
The executive-attention theory of WMC argues that WMC span tasks capture 
both components of executive attention: goal maintenance and competition resolution. As 
discussed previously, the experience of mind wandering is the result of TUTs hijacking 
the task goals, resulting in a goal maintenance failure. Therefore, TUTs should be 
predicted by individual differences in WMC. Kane et al. (2007) first demonstrated this 
relationship using a daily-life experience sampling method. One hundred twenty-six 
subjects, having previously completed WMC screening, carried Palm Pilot PDAs that 
beeped randomly 8 times a day for 7 days. At the beep, subjects were asked to 
immediately respond to the phrase “At the time of the beep, my mind had wandered to 
something other than what I was doing.” Following their binary yes/no response, subject 
answered additional questions about thought content, perceived control over thought, and 
context variables (e.g., What I’m doing right now is related to schoolwork). Not all 
everyday tasks require executive-control capabilities that define the types of lab tasks 
(e.g., Stroop, antisaccade) and more general measures (e.g., SATs; tests of fluid 
intelligence) that WMC predicts. Therefore, Kane et al. predicted that there would be no 
overall WMC differences in mind wandering rates but that WMC differences in mind 
wandering would emerge only at times when subjects were attempting to control their 
attention.  
As predicted, there was no overall relationship between WMC and reports of off-
task thinking. There were, however, several important interactions with context factors 
that support the notion of WMC differences in mind wandering during attention-
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demanding situations. For example, subjects were asked to rate their level of 
concentration and the effort demanded by the ongoing task at the time of the beep. At 
high levels of concentration and effort, higher WMC reported less mind wandering than 
lower WMC subjects, indicating that lower WMC subjects were having more difficulty 
maintaining their attention on high-concentration and high-effort tasks. One limitation of 
this experience sampling method, however, is that we do not get a measure of how well 
subjects are performing on a daily-life task during which they report mind wandering. 
McVay et al. (2009) collected (subjective) performance data and TUT reports during 
daily life in another ESM study.  For each probe during daily life, subjects rated their 
performance of their current activity. Subjects’ TUT reports predicted their performance 
ratings such that when subjects were mind wandering, they were more likely to report 
poor performance in their daily life activities, compared to when they were on-task. 
Unfortunately, the sample in McVay et al. (in press) was too small for assessment of 
individual differences in WMC and their effect on the TUT-performance relationship. 
In a related line of studies, researchers have demonstrated a positive relationship 
between WMC and the ability to suppress or inhibit a particular intrusive thought. Brewin 
and Beaton (2002) used the “white bear” suppression paradigm (Wegner, Schneider, 
Carter, & White, 1987) whereby subjects are asked to refrain from thinking about a white 
bear during a period of time and report intrusions. Subjects with higher WMC (as 
measured by Ospan) reported fewer intrusions of the forbidden thought (Brewin & 
Beaton, 2002). Individual differences in WMC also predict suppression of particular real-
life events (Brewin & Smart, 2005; Geraerts, Marckelbach, Jelicic, & Habets, 2007). In 
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these studies, subjects identified a particular life event or intrusive thought from their 
personal experience and attempted to keep it out of their mind for a specified time period. 
Low WMC subjects experienced more intrusions of the designated thought content than 
high WMC subjects (Brewin & Smart, 2005; Geraerts et al., 2007). The suppression of 
particular thoughts may be related to a general ability to maintain on-task thoughts, 
although the relationship of these two constructs remains to be tested. WMC predicts 
both thought suppression and the propensity to mind wander, suggesting that thought 
control may be an important part of goal maintenance and that off-task thoughts should 
lead to performance errors. 
Mind Wandering, WMC, and Performance Errors 
The executive-attention theory predicts a mediating role of mind wandering 
between WMC and errors. WMC span tasks capture individual differences in executive 
attention, the same resources necessary to keep one’s thoughts on task and a prerequisite 
to accurate performance in attention-demanding tasks. Goal maintenance, one component 
of executive attention, is disrupted when mind wandering occurs. Therefore, the 
occurrence of TUTs should explain the same variance as executive-attention driven 
WMC scores in reading comprehension. In the SART study discussed earlier (McVay & 
Kane, 2009), subject were screened for their WMC prior to completing the SART with 
thought probes. WMC variation significantly predicted TUTs (r = -.22), SART accuracy 
(r = .29) and intra-subject variation in reaction time (r = -.35). Furthermore, mind 
wandering rate accounted for half WMC’s shared variance with performance, indicating 
that the experience of TUTs partially mediated the relationship between WMC and goal-
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neglect errors. These findings are in line with the dual-component nature of the 
executive-attention theory. Goal neglect errors can be the result of either insufficient goal 
maintenance or competition resolution. The mediating relationship of mind wandering 
thus most likely indicates instances where maintenance of the task goal is interrupted by 
TUTs, whereas the remaining, unique variance in goal neglect accounted for by WMC 
variation is the competition resolution component. The SART promotes the build-up of a 
strong habitual response on non-target trials, thus making the withholding of the response 
to target trials difficult even when the task goal is properly maintained. SART is an 
example of a task where both goal maintenance and competition resolution contribute to 
task performance and mind wandering mediates the relationship between WMC and 
performance. Indeed, mind wandering should mediate the WMC-performance 
relationship in any task that requires goal maintenance for performance. Reading is an 
activity that requires goal maintenance and shares an established relationship with WMC. 
Therefore, in the current study, I examine WMC, reading comprehension, and mind 
wandering. 
WMC and Reading Comprehension 
Daneman and Merikle’s (1996) meta-analysis on 77 studies of WMC and reading 
comprehension measures concluded that individual differences in WMC predict 
comprehension (rs =.30 - .52). Furthermore, it is not only the reading version of span 
tasks (verifying sentences and remembering letters or words) that predicts reading 
comprehension, but operation span tasks (e.g., verifying math problems and remembering 
letters) also do, indicating that the verbal processing component in reading span does not 
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entirely drive the relationship. Many of the studies in the meta-analysis used subjects’ 
Verbal Scholastic Aptitude (VSAT) scores as a measure of reading comprehension. In 
some ways, this dependent measure may underestimate the relationship between WMC 
and reading because the passages are fairly short and intermixed with vocabulary and 
analogy sub-tests. Test-takers are also able to look back through the text while answering 
questions, requiring them to integrate less information from the text as a whole (i.e., they 
can hunt for the specific answers without an overall understanding of the text). Both of 
these characteristics of the VSAT may limit the contribution of WMC to performance in 
that the brevity of the passages may not require sustained attention in the same way as 
would a longer textbook chapter or journal article. Performance on reading tasks require 
that subjects to maintain focus on the material for longer periods of time and generate 
general inferences used to understand the text as a whole should be positively – and 
strongly – related to WMC.  
Current Study 
The primary goal of this study was to investigate the mediating role of mind 
wandering in the relationship between WMC and reading comprehension. As reviewed 
above, both WMC and mind wandering predict reading comprehension, but this is the 
first study combining these two individual-difference variables to establish their 
relationship to one another in predicting comprehension. Using a latent-variable, 
structural-equation-model approach, I used several measures to derive the variables of 
interest: WMC, mind wandering, and reading comprehension. The WMC variable was 
derived from three span tasks to get a good estimate of the domain-general nature. Mind 
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wandering was assessed using experimenter-scheduled thought probes during four 
different tasks. Two of the tasks were reading for comprehension, in order to look 
directly at the relationship between TUTs and comprehension. These reading tasks, in 
addition to five ‘clean’ reading comprehension tasks (i.e., no mind wandering probes) 
were used to derive a comprehension latent variable. The other two tasks with probes 
were low-level attention tasks. If individual differences in TUTs on non-reading tasks 
also predict comprehension, it would provide stronger evidence for mind wandering 
propensity as a cause of poor reading rather than an effect of poor reading skills.  
The two additional attention-restraint tasks were included to help evaluate a 
mediation claim implicit in the executive-attention theory of WMC. This theory posits 
that executive attention is the underlying construct connecting WMC to performance on 
complex cognitive tasks and is supported by the relationship between WMC and low 
level attention tasks such as Stroop and antisaccade (Kane & Engle, 2003; Engle & Kane, 
2004). However, the mediation of an executive-attention latent variable in the 
relationship between WMC and complex cognitive tasks, although implied by the theory, 
remains untested. The addition of attention restraint tasks with known relationships to 
WMC (SART, Stroop, and antisaccade; see methods for details) to this design allowed 
me to test this mediation model using reading comprehension as the complex cognitive 
task. Furthermore, the measurement of mind wandering during these tasks provided a 
domain-general estimate of mind-wandering propensity instead of one specific to reading 
situations. 
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CHAPTER II 
METHODS 
 
 
Participants 
 
Participants were recruited from the undergraduate participant pool at the 
University of North Carolina at Greensboro (UNCG) and they participated for course 
credit. Native English speakers between 18 and 35 years old were invited to participate. 
Of the 258 participants who gave written informed consent to participate, 248 completed 
two sessions, and 242 completed all three sessions of the study. 
WMC Measures 
The tasks used to measure WMC were those recommended by a recent 
methodological review (Conway et al., 2005). All three measures of WMC required 
subjects to switch between a processing component and a memory component. Operation 
span (Ospan) required subjects to verify the answers to compound mathematical 
equations (e.g., (2+2)/1 = 4) while remembering letters presented after each equation. At 
the end of 3-6 equation-letter trials, subjects recalled the letters in the order they were 
presented by clicking boxes (in order) next to 12 possible letters. Reading span (Rspan) 
used the same memory stimuli but subjects decided whether a sentence made sense or not 
as the processing task (e.g., “I like to run in the sky”). Spatial span (Sspan), unlike the 
other two tasks, did not use verbal stimuli. Subjects remembered sequentially-presented 
locations on a 4×4 grid presented following a decision about whether 16×16 grid patterns
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 were symmetrical along the vertical axis. After each set of grid patterns and 4x4 grid 
locations, subjects indicated the locations in order by clicking in the boxes in an empty 
4x4 grid. All three tasks were automated and presented using E-prime software. Subjects 
practiced each part of the task (processing task, memory task) separately and then 
together prior to beginning the test trials. During the practice portion of the processing 
task alone (15 problems), the program computed the average time it took to complete 
each trial. During the combined trials, if subjects took longer than two standard 
deviations above their mean processing time from practice, the computer skipped to the 
memory component and the trial was designated an error. This way, subjects could not 
take extra time during the processing task to rehearse the memory items.  
Reading Comprehension Measures 
The reading tasks in this study were selected to represent a wide range of the 
types of reading materials that people encounter in daily life. Only two of the reading 
comprehension measures included thought probes in case the probes somehow affected 
reading (either by interrupting integration of the test or by alerting subjects when they are 
off task). For each reading task (other than the VSAT), Flesch-Kincaid scores for ease 
and grade level are reported below. Flesch-Kincaid (F-K) scores are based on word 
length and sentence structure as opposed to conceptual content. Higher ease scores 
indicate less difficult passages (most 13-15 year olds can easily read passages in the 
range 60-70).  
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Verbal SATs. The first measure of reading comprehension was the subject’s score 
on the Verbal Scholastic Aptitude Test (VSAT) as recorded by UNCG’s admissions 
office and accessed with subjects’ permission.  
Inference Verification Test. Materials for this task came directly from Griffin, 
Wiley, and Thiede (2007) where overall comprehension was related to individual 
differences in WMC (r = .32). At their own pace, subjects read onscreen (only once and 
with no additional instructions; see Griffin et al., 2007 for instruction manipulations) two 
600-900 word explanatory texts about bacteria and volcanoes, with F-K grade levels of 
11-12 and F-K ease scores in the “difficult” range, 31-49. Following each passage, 
subjects completed a self-paced Inference Verification Test (IVT) on which they 
responded true or false to statements that tapped comprehension of the text based on 
drawing inferences from the passage (e.g., Volcanoes occur where oceanic and 
continental plates converge). 
Psychological Journal Articles. The materials for these tasks came from a 
previous study on feedback and memory, and represented the type of reading material 
and test format used in higher education (Kang, McDermitt, & Roediger, 2007). 
Furthermore, a recently-completed dissertation project at UNCG, drawing from the same 
undergraduate population and using the same materials, provided information about 
accuracy rates (McConnell, 2009), as the original study population was from a more 
selective university (Kang et al., 2007). This task comprised 2 articles, of 2000-2500 
words, from Current Directions in Psychological Science. The two articles, Anastasio, 
Rose, and Chapman (1999) about media bias and Treiman (2000) about literacy, had F-K 
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ease scores in the range of 40-65 and F-K grade levels of 5.5 and 7.5, respectively 
(calculated in MS Word). Eight multiple choice questions for each article were taken 
directly from Kang et al. (2007), with an additional 4 questions created by McConnell 
(2009), to make 12 per article. Subjects had 15 minutes to read each article on paper 
followed by a computerized comprehension test. One of the two articles, Treiman (2000), 
presented auditory thought probes every 2-4 minutes (see mind wandering measures for 
additional details on thought probes). 
Novel Reading Task. The reading material for this task was taken from Schooler 
et al. (2004), but the comprehension testing was unique for our purposes. Subjects read 
the first five chapters of Tolstoy’s War and Peace in a self-paced, paragraph by 
paragraph format presented on the computer in Times New Roman font size 15. This 
excerpt was approximately 8000 words and had a F-K grade level of 8.3 and a F-K ease 
score of 65.5 (calculated in MS Word). Subjects completed true/false comprehension 
questions at reasonable intervals based on the progression of the story. The questions 
prompted subjects to verify information from the reading up to that point and were 
therefore placed at positions in the text where enough new information had been 
presented to justify a new question. I collected accuracy and RT data on the questions, as 
well as RT data for reading each screen. Reading comprehension questions were piloted 
on 95 subjects prior to this project and adjusted based on internal reliability; questions 
producing close to perfect or close to zero accuracy were replaced. Thought probes 
appeared throughout the text (see mind wandering section for details) and were each 
followed by a comprehension question.  
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Subjects had 50 minutes to read the novel excerpt and answer as many questions 
and probes as possible (up to 20). In pilot testing, 90 of the 95 subjects completed the 
chapters within 50 minutes. Subjects who completed the first five chapters and all 20 
questions in less than the allotted time continued reading additional chapters until the 
session was over. We included additional reading material to avoid subjects finishing 
early and potentially prompting other subjects to skip through in the hopes of finishing 
early. We did not collect RT data or comprehension information during the additional 
chapters but the transition from data collection to extra reading was seamless to the 
subjects. 
Short Story Reading Task. Subjects read two short stories, self-paced, presented 
paragraph by paragraph on the computer in Times New Roman font size 16, The Coming-
Out of Maggie by O. Henry (Maggie) and Eveline by James Joyce. The short stories 
paralleled the journal articles in word length (~2500). Maggie had a F-K grade level of 
6.2 and a F-K ease score of 73; Eveline had a F-K grade level of 4.8 and a F-K ease score 
of 82.9 (calculated in MS Word). Following each story, subjects completed six true/false 
questions and six multiple-choice questions to assess whether they comprehended the 
basic theme and plot of the story. Reading comprehension questions for Maggie were 
piloted on 95 subjects prior to data collection and adjusted based on internal reliability; 
questions producing close to perfect or close to zero accuracy were replaced. 
Attention Restraint Tasks 
Stroop Task. Subjects completed a numerical Stroop task where the task goal was 
to report the number of items presented on each trial. In the classic color-word Stroop, 
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words are presented in different colored inks and subjects are expected to name the ink 
color. In the numerical variation of the Stroop task, 2, 3, or 4 digits were presented on 
each trial and subjects were instructed to report the number of items presented (e.g., 
Windes, 1968; for review, see MacLeod, 1991). Congruent trials were those where the 
number of digits matched the value of the presented digits (e.g., 333) and incongruent 
trials presented a mismatch (e.g., 222; correct answer is three). Stroop stimuli were 
presented in Courier New font size 24. Subjects responded by indicating the number of 
items presented on each trial by pressing the b key for 2, the n key for 3, and the m key 
for 4 with their dominant hand. Prior to the start of the Stroop task, subjects completed 36 
mapping trials where they used the b, n, and m keys to respond to the number of red 
boxes onscreen (2, 3, or 4, respectively). Subjects performed 480 experimental trials 
total, in sets of 60 trials at 75% congruency (without noticeable breaks to the subject). 
Within each set of 60 trials, 15 congruent and 15 incongruent trials were marked for 
reaction time and accuracy analysis to equate the number of trials analyzed in each 
condition (75% congruent = 15 incongruent trials). Mind-wandering probes followed 
60% of the incongruent trials in the second half of the task. 
Pilot testing (N= 39) revealed RT and accuracy costs on incongruent trials 
compared to congruent trials (Ms = 10% accuracy difference and 109 ms RT difference). 
I also looked at whether probes on the second half of the trials affected accuracy or RT; 
they did not. Furthermore, overall accuracy was significantly correlated with TUTs (r = -
.43) and subjects made more errors when they reported a TUT than an on-task thought (M 
accuracy= .83 vs. M = .93, t(38) = -2.66, p = .01). 
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Semantic SART. Subjects completed a 20-minute version of a Sustained Attention 
to Response Task (SART) with semantic stimuli from McVay and Kane (2009). The 
SART is a go/no-go task where subjects must respond quickly with a key press to all 
presented stimuli except infrequent (11%) target trials. In this version of SART, word 
stimuli were presented in Courier New font size 18 for 300 ms followed by a 900 ms 
mask. Most of the stimuli (non-targets) were members of one category (animals) and 
infrequent targets were members of a different category (foods). The SART had 540 
trials, 60 targets and 36 probes. Mind wandering probes followed 60% of target trials. 
At the end of the SART, subjects completed a short computerized questionnaire 
asking them to estimate how long it took to complete the SART, how well they did on the 
task (accuracy estimate, % correct) and how often they were mind wandering (global 
estimate, % of time mind wandering). They also reported how hard they were 
concentrating and how much effort they were putting into the task (using 7-point Likert 
scales).  
Antisaccade Task. In this task, a quick flash on one side of the screen reliably 
predicted the appearance of a target on the opposite side of the screen. Following a key 
press response to a ‘ready’ screen, a blank screen lasting unpredictably between 200 ms 
and 2200 ms preceded the flashing cue. A Courier New font size 24 “=” flashed 100 ms 
on, 50 ms off, 100 ms on, about 12 cm from the center (randomly but equally often to the 
left and right), drawing attention to that location (Kane et al., 2001). The target (in 
Wingdings 3 font size 28), an arrow pointing up, down, right, or left, appeared the same 
distance from center, on the opposite side, for 150 ms and was then masked by a plus 
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sign for 1500 ms or until the subject responded. Subjects were instructed to press an 
arrow on the keyboard corresponding to the direction of the target arrow (Roberts, Hager, 
& Heron, 1994). Subjects performed 10 practice trials where the stimulus appeared in the 
center of the screen followed by 72 trials experimental trials.  
Mind Wandering Probes 
Thought probes requiring subjects to classify the contents of their immediately 
preceding thoughts appeared during four of the tasks in this study. The instructions asked 
subjects to answer the probe based on their thought content just before the probe 
appeared and not to try to reconstruct all of their thought content since the last probe. The 
thought probes were modified slightly to reflect the nature of the ongoing task in the 
category options, for example (as it appeared during War & Peace): 
What were you just thinking about? 
1. The text 
2. How well I’m understanding the story 
3. A memory from the past 
4. Something in the future 
5. Current state of being 
6. Other 
Subjects responded by pressing a number on the keyboard corresponding to their thought 
category. For analysis, the first two categories were coded as task-related, versus task-
related interference (TRI), respectively. Responses of 3-6 were coded as task-unrelated 
thoughts (TUTs). 
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Stroop Task. During the first 4 sets of 60 trials, there were no thought probes. In the 
second half of the task, thought probes were attached to 9 of the 15 randomly-occurring 
incongruent trials within each set of 60 trials for a total of 36 thought probes. The probe 
appeared as soon as the subject responded to the previous trial and terminated when the 
subject responded. 
Semantic SART. Probes followed directly after 60% of the target trials, randomly 
distributed throughout the entire task (36 probes). 
Journal Article Reading Task. While reading the Treiman (2000) journal article, the 
computer screen directly in front of them (in their peripheral vision as they read the 
printed article) flashed red every 2-4 minutes (6 probes in 15 minutes) signaling them to 
respond to the thought probe that appeared next on the computer screen. After entering 
their probe response, they resumed reading the article on paper.  
Novel Reading Task. While subjects read War and Peace, a probe appeared just prior 
to each comprehension question (20 possible probes). 
Procedure 
Subjects were tested in groups of 1-6 and completed 4.5 hours of testing broken 
into three 90-minute sessions. Subjects were informed that participation in all three 
sessions was necessary to receive their full participation credit prior to signing up for the 
first session. All three sessions were completed within the same semester (14 weeks of 
testing), but the interval between sessions varied because subjects scheduled their own 
appointments for each session (M = 31 days [SD = 19] to complete all three sessions). 
The order of the tasks is presented in Table 1. 
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Statistical Procedure 
I report non-directional null-hypothesis significance tests with an alpha of .05. I 
report several fit statistics for confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) and structural equation 
model (SEM) analyses, as is typically recommended (e.g., Kline, 1998). The chi-square 
statistic (χ² ) is a “badness-of-fit” test because it reflects whether there is a significant 
difference between the expected and observed covariance matrixes. Non-significant chi-
square tests indicate good model fit. However, chi-square tests are sensitive to sample 
size and are often significant as a result of a slight difference between the expected and 
observed covariance matrixes. Informally, then, a chi-square to degrees of freedom ratio 
of less than 2 may be used to indicate good model fit. I report the confirmatory fit index 
(CFI) and the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), which are less 
sensitive to sample size. The CFI is a measure of the extent to which the model fits better 
than an ‘independent’ model where all covariances are set to zero; values greater than .90 
reflect a good fit. RMSEA compares the model to the population covariance matrix; 
values less than .05 are considered excellent fit. Finally, I report the standardized root-
mean square residual (SRMR), which reflects the average squared difference between the 
observed and reproduced covariances. SRMR values less than .05 indicate excellent 
model fit (Kline, 1998). 
For the SEM models, I report both the direct path coefficients and the indirect 
effects. The coefficient for the indirect effect is interpreted like a path coefficient. For 
example, if the path coefficient between WMC and TUT rate is X, then for every 1 SD 
increase in WMC, TUT should increase by X(SD). Then, if reading comprehension 
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decreases by Y for every 1 SD increase in TUT, the indirect effect of WMC on reading 
comprehension through TUT is the product of the X (represented by the path coefficient 
from WMC to TUT) and Y (the path coefficient from TUT to comprehension). 
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CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
 
 
 The software used for the CFA and SEM analyses, Mplus, deals well with 
missing data and therefore, data were dropped at a task level instead of a subject level. 
Subjects who did not complete all tasks were included in analysis using the data from the 
tasks they completed. The data from subjects with outlier scores on some tasks were left 
for analysis; only data from the particular task on which they produced an outlier were 
excluded (see below). An error in the program for data collection during the second 
journal article task resulted in accurate data for only 166 subjects on that task. 
 Five subjects completed only the second and third session due to an error in the 
system for signing up to participate, therefore no data from Session I (Ospan, Stroop, 
Journal Article 1, and Maggie) are available for those subjects, so the total possible 
subjects for Session I tasks is 253. All 253 were included for Ospan and Journal Article 1. 
For Stroop, the data for one subject were lost due to computer malfunction and nine 
subjects were dropped for failure to follow instructions (i.e., congruent accuracy = 0%, 
indicating they were not responding with the correct keys). Three subjects were dropped 
from Maggie because they were outliers on reading time (M < 5000 ms; compared to 
overall M = 14801 ms) and accuracy (M < .25; less than chance for multiple choice 
questions), suggesting they were skipping through and not reading the story.
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Two hundred forty-eight subjects completed the second session (Sspan, SART, 
War & Peace). The data from one subject for War & Peace, one subject for SART, and 
two subjects for Sspan were lost due to computer malfunction (e.g., subject kicking the 
power cord out of the wall). Data from three subjects were dropped from Sspan for too 
many errors on the processing task (>15%; see Conway et. al., 2005). The data from 17 
SART subjects were corrupted due to a programming error and 5 subjects were dropped 
for failure to follow instructions (non-target accuracy < .80). 
 Of the 242 subjects who completed the third session (Rspan, Journal Article 2, 
IVT, Antisaccade, Eveline), data from one subject in Rspan and six subjects in 
Antisaccade were dropped as a result of computer or program problems. In addition, data 
from three subjects were dropped from Rspan for errors (> 15%; see Conway et. al., 
2005). One outlier from Antisaccade, whose accuracy was 0%, was dropped. In the IVT, 
one outlier with fast reading times and low accuracy, most likely indicating a failure to do 
the task, was dropped. Data from two subjects in the Eveline task were dropped for less 
than chance accuracy on the comprehension test (17%). 
 When I ran the CFA analysis, I also tested for multivariate outliers. I isolated 
three subjects whose Mahalanobis distance exceeded the standard cut-off (χ² at p = .001 
for the number of variables). None of the main SEM findings changed as a result of 
removing these three subjects. I also isolated seven subjects who were outliers on both 
Mahalanobis distance and Cook’s D (by analyzing a scatterplot of the two variables). 
None of the main SEM findings changed as a result of removing these seven subjects. 
37 
 
Below I report the statistics for the dataset excluding the seven multivariate outliers on 
both Mahalanobis distance and Cook’s D thereby making n = 251 for the SEM models. 
WMC and Reading Comprehension Measures 
 The descriptive statistics for the three WMC span tasks and the seven reading 
comprehension measures are presented in Table 2; correlations among these measures are 
presented in Table 3. The z-score composite for the WMC measures was calculated using 
a database with over 2000 subjects. Overall, the mean WMC composite z-score 
(averaging the three span tasks; M = .17, SD = .79) was slightly higher than the mean z-
score in the laboratory database (M = 0). The WMC tasks correlate well with each other, 
Ospan with Rspan (r = .61), Ospan with Sspan (r = .44), and Sspan with Rspan (r = .47). 
The WMC measures do not yield reliability estimates but the correlations among the 
tasks indicate a reasonable lower bound for reliability (i.e., the correlation between tasks 
cannot exceed the reliability of the least reliable task). Regarding the reading measures, 
some of the reliability estimates were low, but acceptable given the correlations among 
the tasks (rs = .17 to .51 with most in the .35 range). 
Verbal SATs. For the VSAT scores, I report the proportion of points the student 
earned (out of 800) to mirror the accuracy scores on other measures. The mean VSAT 
score in our sample (M = .64, or 510 out of 800) was very close to the national average 
for 2008 (M = .63, or 502 out of 800; College Board 
http://professionals.collegeboard.com/testing/sat-reasoning/scores/averages; accessed 
8/20/2009) 
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Inference Verification Test. Performance on the IVT (M = .67) was similar to 
performance reported in previous work with the same materials (Griffin et al., 2008; M = 
.69).  
Psychological Journal Articles. Subjects were given 15 minutes to read the 
journal articles. For the first journal article, 36% of subjects finished the whole article in 
the allotted time and 92% finished reading the second journal article (it was slightly 
shorter). The two journal articles yielded similar performance rates to McConnell (2008; 
for the Treiman (2000) article: M = .49, SD = .15 vs. M = .49, SD = .14 in McConnell, 
2008; for the Anastasio et al. (1999) article: M = .62, SD = .18 vs. M = .60, SD = .18 in 
McConnell, 2008 ). The two comprehension measures, however, were not significantly 
correlated with each other (r = .12, p=.14), most likely due to the low completion rate 
and low reliability of the first journal article. 
Novel Reading Task. Most subjects (82.5%) finished reading the passage from 
War & Peace in the 50-minute time limit, therefore the mean numbers of questions and 
probes was 19.23 (range 11-20). The number of questions subjects completed (based on 
how far they got in the text in the allotted time) did not correlate with accuracy (r = -.08) 
or TUTs (r = .07). The mean reading time for each paragraph (M = 18 sec, SD = 5 sec) 
did not correlate with accuracy (r = .07) or mind wandering (r = -.10). 
 Subjects performed similarly on the true/false comprehension questions as 
subjects in a previous study using similar materials (.73 versus .69 in Reichle et al., 
submitted). Subjects were caught mind wandering far more often in our study than in 
Reichle et al. (submitted; 51% versus 10%-30% of probes). It is unclear how many 
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probes Reichle et al. (submitted) presented because they were dependent on subjects’ 
self-caught reports of mind wandering. These self-caught reports also make it difficult to 
directly compare mind wandering frequency across studies.  
Short Story Reading Tasks. For Maggie, the mean reading time for each paragraph 
(M = 15 sec, SD = 3 sec) did not correlate with comprehension-test accuracy (r = .05). 
For Eveline, the mean reading time for each paragraph (M = 25 sec, SD = 6 sec) did not 
correlate with accuracy (r = .04). 
Attention Restraint Tasks 
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for the attention tasks. In the Stroop task, 
the interesting trials are the incongruent trials (where the digits mismatch the number of 
items). The majority of the Stroop effect is seen in slow RTs to the incongruent stimuli. 
In subsequent analyses of this dataset, we focused on RT from the incongruent trials. I 
used the incongruent RTs instead of accuracy because accuracy was almost at ceiling. I 
did not use the RT difference between congruent and incongruent trials (traditional 
Stroop effect) in the SEM models because Stroop incongruent RT shared higher simple 
correlations with the other attention restraint measures and loaded significantly on an 
attention restraint latent factor. In the antisaccade task, unlike the Stroop, all trials are 
“incongruent,” in that they all go against the habitual response. Accuracy was not at 
ceiling in the antisaccade, so we used it as our primary dependent variable for 
performance in this task in analyses of the whole dataset from this study. 
As in previous work with the SART (McVay & Kane, 2009; McVay & Kane, in 
prep), we calculated a signal-detection sensitivity score for each subject using the 
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formula for logistic distributions (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988): dL = ln{[H(1 – FA)]/[(1 – 
H)FA]}, and a CL score, representing bias, using: CL = 0.5[ln{[(1 – FA)(1 – 
H)]/[(H)(FA)]}], where ln = natural log, H = hit proportion, and FA = false-alarm 
proportion. We adjusted individual hit or false-alarm rates of 0 and 1 by .01. Negative CL 
scores reflect a “go” bias. We also calculated each subjects’ individual RT variability 
(i.e., their RT standard deviation). The dL score and RT variability have been related to 
performance, WMC, and TUTs in previous work (McVay & Kane, 2009; McVay & 
Kane, in prep), but CL has not been linked to WMC or TUTs. For analyses of the entire 
dataset, we used the signal-detection sensitivity score (dL ) and RT variability as 
performance measures from the SART. 
Mind wandering within tasks 
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics for the mind wandering measures. In all four 
tasks with probes, mind wandering increased over time. For Stroop, War & Peace, and 
JA2, I divided the tasks into halves; I divided the SART probes into quarters because 
there were many more trials and to be consistent with previous work (McVay & Kane, 
2009). During the Stroop task, TUT rates increased from Block 1 (M = .24) to Block 2 
(M = .36; t(239) = -5.87, p < .001). Similarly, during War & Peace, TUT rates increased 
from Block 1 (M = .48) to Block 2 (M = .54, t(243) = -3.49, p < .001). The same pattern 
occurred in JA2, TUT rates increased from Block 1 (M = .27) to Block 2 (M = .49, t(165) 
= -8.43, p < .001). TUTs also increased over the quarters of SART (Ms = .16, .25, .30, 
.39; F(3, 645) = 64.36, p < .001). 
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Mind wandering predicts performance 
Mind wandering rate during the Stroop task was significantly correlated with overall 
accuracy (r = -.17), incongruent accuracy (r = -.15), and incongruent RT (r = .42). 
Furthermore, subjects were less accurate on trials when they reported TUTs (M = .84) 
than on-task thoughts (M = .91; t(225) = -5.49, p < .001). Mind wandering during the 
SART task did not correlate significantly with accuracy (dL ; r = -.04), but did correlate 
with RT variability (r = .27). In contrast, in-the-moment TUT reports predicted errors on 
target trials (M = .62) when compared to reports of on-task thoughts (M = .42; t(179) = 
7.03, p < .001). Mind wandering reported during journal article reading correlated 
significantly with overall accuracy on the comprehension questions (r = -.31). 
Conditional probabilities for comprehension during on and off-task thoughts were not 
calculated because the questions were administered at the end of the reading and were not 
tied to a specific probe or section of the text. Mind wandering rates during the War & 
Peace reading task correlated with overall accuracy on the comprehension questions (r = 
-.41). However, although subjects were numerically more likely to answer 
comprehension questions correctly when they reported on-task thinking (M = .73) than 
when they reported TUTs (M = .72), this contrast was not significant (t(197) < 1). This 
may be the result of a methodological limitation in the War & Peace task. Namely, the 
questions were all true/false format, allowing a 50% chance of guessing the correct 
answer regardless of reading comprehension or mind wandering.  
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WMC, reading comprehension, attention restraint, and mind wandering measures 
 The simple correlations for WMC, reading comprehension measures, attention 
restraint tasks, and mind wandering measures are presented in Table 3. I established a 
measurement model for the various tasks by loading them onto latent factors using 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA).  
Using CFA, I loaded the observed variables onto four latent variables: WMC, 
mind wandering, reading comprehension, and attention restraint. A priori, I chose to 
allow certain residual variances in the model to correlate so as best to account for existing 
relationships between the observed measures. For the latent variable WMC, I allowed 
Ospan and Rspan to correlate because the storage component of both tasks is recalling 
letters. For the mind wandering latent variable, I allowed TUTs from the SART and the 
Stroop task to correlate above and beyond the general variance accounted for by the 
latent variable because of the similarity of the primary task demands (attention restraint). 
I also allowed the two TUT measures from reading tasks to correlate, but the correlation 
was not significant in the CFA and therefore dropped from the model. Finally, for the 
attention restraint latent variable, I allowed the two performance measures from the 
SART task, dL and RT variability to correlate. In subsequent SEM models, I only 
included significantly correlated residuals from those listed above.  
The four-factor CFA model with latent variables for WMC, reading 
comprehension, attention restraint, and mind wandering fit the data well (χ² (126, N = 
251) = 194.51, p < .001; χ²:df = 1.54; CFI = .924; RMSEA = .046; SRMR = .060, see 
Figure 1). The mind wandering measures from four different tasks loaded well onto one 
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latent variable, suggesting that TUT rate is a stable individual difference variable. As 
expected, WMC and attention restraint both correlated positively and significantly with 
reading comprehension. Mind wandering, in contrast, was negatively correlated with 
WMC, attention restraint, and reading comprehension. 
Does mind wandering mediate the relationship between WMC and reading 
comprehension? 
 Using the latent variables for WMC, reading comprehension, and mind wandering 
established above, I tested mind wandering as a mediator in the relationship between 
WMC and reading comprehension. Figure 2 presents a partial mediation model (χ² (73, N 
= 251) = 119.78, p = .001; χ²:df = 1.64; CFI = .938; RMSEA = .051; SRMR = .057), 
whereby WMC predicts reading comprehension both through mind wandering and 
independently,  and Figure 3 presents the full mediation model (χ² (74, N = 251) = 
123.74, p < .001; χ²:df = 1.67; CFI = .935; RMSEA = .052; SRMR = .062) whereby all 
the variance in reading comprehension predicted by WMC is through mind wandering. 
Both models fit the data well and show significant indirect effects of WMC on reading 
comprehension through the mind wandering variable. The indirect effect in the partial 
mediation model (Figure 2) was .112, p = .022 and in the full mediation model (Figure 3) 
was .151, p = .009. Because both models fit the data well and show a significant indirect 
effect, a χ² difference test was appropriate to determine which model better fits the data. 
The χ² difference test was significant; that is, the difference between the χ² of the full 
mediation model (123.74) and the partial mediation model (119.78; χ² diff = 3.96) was 
greater than the critical value (3.84) for χ² at one degree of freedom (the difference 
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between degrees of freedom in the two models). The significant χ² difference test 
signifies that, as expected, the data support a model with partial mediation of mind 
wandering in the relationship between WMC and reading comprehension.  
Does attention restraint mediate the relationship between WMC and reading 
comprehension? 
 The executive-attention view of WMC posits that attention control underlies the 
relationship between WMC and more complex cognitive tasks. In order to test this view 
further, I fit a model to the data whereby attention restraint, a form of attention control, 
mediates the relationship between WMC and reading comprehension. As before, I tested 
both a partial mediation and a full mediation model. However, in this case, the pathway 
from WMC to reading comprehension was not significant in the partial mediation model 
(Figure 4), suggesting that WMC only predicts reading comprehension through its shared 
variance with attention restraint. Even with the non-significant pathway, the mediation 
model fit the data well (χ² (72, N = 251) = 100.49, p = .0149; χ²:df = 1.39; CFI = .959; 
RMSEA = .040; SRMR = .052) and the indirect effect of WMC on reading 
comprehension through attention restraint was marginally significant .381, p = .056. The 
fit improved slightly (χ² (73, N = 251) = 100.56, p =.018; χ²:df = 1.38; CFI = .961; 
RMSEA = .039; SRMR = .052) when I dropped the non-significant pathway (thereby 
making it a full mediation model) and the indirect effect of WMC on reading 
comprehension through attention restraint was significant in this model (.267, p < .001). 
This model suggests that only the variance common to WMC and attention restraint tasks 
predicted reading comprehension and that beyond that shared variance, WMC does not 
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independently predict reading comprehension. These and the other main SEM results 
remain true even if VSAT (an uncontrolled variable possibly measuring more than 
reading comprehension, see Daneman & Hannon, 2001) is excluded from the model. 
Does mind wandering mediate the relationship between executive attention and reading 
comprehension? 
 Based on the executive-attention theory of WMC and the finding above that 
attention restraint fully mediates the relationship between WMC and reading 
comprehension, I loaded the WMC tasks and the attention restraint tasks on a common 
latent variable, labeled executive attention. This variable is meant to capture the common 
variance, due to a general attention control ability, that determines performance on both 
WMC and attention restraint tasks. For this model, I allowed the residual variance from 
the WMC tasks to correlate to account for the contribution of memory (above and beyond 
attention control) to the performance on the WMC tasks. One component of executive 
attention, goal maintenance (i.e., keeping the goals of the primary task accessible), is 
captured by mind wandering measures and therefore I predicted that TUTs would 
mediate the relationship between executive attention and reading comprehension. The 
partial mediation model (Figure 5) fit the data well (χ² (127, N = 251) = 188.56, p < .001; 
χ²:df = 1.49; CFI = .932; RMSEA = .044; SRMR = .060) and reflected a significant 
indirect effect of executive attention on reading comprehension through mind wandering 
(.172, p = .006).  
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CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 The current study demonstrated the importance of mind wandering as a mediator 
in the relationship between WMC and reading comprehension. Latent variable analysis of 
multiple mind wandering measures, WMC, reading comprehension, and attention 
restraint tasks provided important information for theories of mind wandering, WMC, 
and executive control. Mind wandering rates representing failures to maintain on-task 
thoughts, were stable across both attention restraint and reading tasks, and this propensity 
for off-task thought was detrimental to performance. WMC, which is thought by some to 
tap executive control of attention (e.g., Kane, Conway, et al., 2007) significantly loaded 
with attention restraint tasks onto a forced single latent factor in the final SEM model 
(Figure 5) and negatively predicted reading comprehension. Finally, TUTs mediated this 
relationship, suggesting that mind wandering explains part of the relationship between 
attention control and reading comprehension. 
 Based on the executive-attention view of WMC, I originally hypothesized that 
TUT rate would fully mediate the relationship between WMC and reading 
comprehension. Although both the partial and full mediation model fit the data well, the 
partial mediation model provided a superior fit, suggesting that WMC predicts reading 
comprehension above and beyond mind wandering. The original hypothesis stemmed 
from the contribution of the dual components of executive attention; I expected goal 
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maintenance to solely drive the relationship between WMC and reading comprehension 
based on the assumption that reading does not require competition resolution in the same 
way as a Stroop or antisaccade task. The partial mediation reported here, however, 
provides three alternative hypotheses. Either competition resolution is required for 
reading comprehension and underlies the additional variance explained by WMC above 
and beyond mind wandering, or mind wandering does not capture the entirety of 
fluctuations in goal maintenance during reading comprehension. A third possibility is that 
WMC contributes to the accrual of vocabulary and grammatical information over a 
lifetime and it is this factor (i.e., the contribution of prior knowledge) that underlies the 
additional variance in reading comprehension explained by WMC. Data from the current 
study refute the third possibility. The variance captured by the attention restraint tasks, 
tasks without vocabulary or grammar demands, fully mediated the relationship between 
WMC and reading comprehension. This full mediation suggests that the relationship 
between WMC and reading comprehension is based on the two components of executive 
attention, goal maintenance and competition resolution, but does not differentiate their 
contributions.  
Previous research on reading comprehension suggests a role for competition 
resolution in processing text. Namely, Gernsbacher and colleagues (e.g., Gernsbacher 
1993; Gernsbacher & Robertson, 1995) identify several situations where suppression of 
an inappropriate word meaning is necessary. For example, the meanings of homonyms 
(turn left at the light vs. she left the party) and homographs (tied a bow vs. bow to the 
emperor) are dependent on context and the inappropriate meaning must be suppressed. 
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This type of competition resolution, although more subtle and occurring less frequently 
than competition resolution on a Stroop or antisaccade task, may contribute to variance in 
reading comprehension accounted for by WMC, beyond its shared variance with mind 
wandering. 
There are several notable limitations to the current study. The mean WMC 
capacity of subjects in this study was slightly elevated (z-score = .165), but I believe the 
results generalize to undergraduate populations as the mean VSAT was very close to the 
national average (510 vs. 502). The second limitation, a methodological change from our 
previous studies (McVay & Kane, 2009, in prep) is the length of the SART. In previous 
versions of the SART, lasting 42 minutes or more, overall TUT rate predicted 
performance. On this shortened version of the SART (approximately 15 minutes), TUTs 
predicted in-the-moment errors but not SART performance overall. I expect in a longer 
SART, fatigue contributes to the increase in TUTs and perhaps, more errors are made as 
a result of mind wandering rather than insufficient behavioral inhibition (i.e., trial-by-trial 
competition resolution). In general, I did not measure the effect of fatigue across tasks in 
the current study. Mind wandering did consistently increase over time within a task, but 
the effect of fatigue across tasks within a session is not reported here. The interaction of 
fatigue and individual differences in control is an important avenue for future research. It 
is possible that individuals with high WMC fatigue at a different rate than those with low 
WMC, but currently, this idea remains untested. 
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Implications for theories of mind wandering 
The current study provides important evidence for the “control failure × 
concerns” view of mind wandering (McVay & Kane, in press). The control failures × 
concerns view posits that mind wandering reflects a failure to control attention and 
maintain task goals, in the face of interference from task-irrelevant, personal-goal related 
thoughts. An important hypothesis derived from this perspective is that those individuals 
with fewer attention-control resources at their disposal will more often succumb to 
interfering thoughts than those with greater attention-control abilities (as will people who 
have more versus less urgent personal concerns with which to contend). As discussed 
above, WMC provides a measure of attention-control abilities; therefore, individual 
differences in WMC should negatively predict mind wandering (as high versus low 
WMC individuals should not systematically differ in their urgency or extent of personal 
concerns; see Future Directions section below). The resource-demanding view of mind 
wandering (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006), in contrast, makes the opposite prediction. 
Namely, those individuals with more executive resources should mind wander more than 
those with fewer. If mind wandering is resource-demanding, and a trade-off occurs 
between devoting resources to the current task and to TUTs, then those individual with 
greater resources should be able to mind wander more often without impacting their task 
performance. Using a latent variable analysis combining measures of mind wandering 
across several tasks, this study demonstrates a negative relationship between WMC and 
TUT rate, in line with the control failures view (see also Kane, Brown, et al., 2007; 
McVay & Kane, 2009). 
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The control failures × concerns view of mind wandering addresses TUTs in 
situations where the current task is demanding and mind wandering results in 
performance deficits. Smallwood (in press) recently reframed the resource-demanding 
view as a global workspace view, whereby the resources demanded by mind wandering, 
originally specified as executive resources (e.g., attention control), are better understood 
as the limited nature of consciousness. In other words, consciousness of off-task thoughts 
displaces conscious awareness of task-related thoughts and therefore these two types of 
thoughts each demand the limited workspace of conscious awareness. Smallwood (in 
press) argues that this view encompasses a broader understanding of mind wandering 
than the control failures × concerns perspective. In attention-demanding tasks, the 
executive attention system interferes in the flow between internal and externally driven 
thoughts in order to keep thoughts external and task-dependent. In these situations, 
internally oriented thoughts (i.e., off-task thoughts) create interference on the control 
system and occasionally failures of control result in the displacement of the task-related 
thoughts from consciousness (i.e., mind wandering). However, in situations where 
control over thoughts is unnecessary for successful completion of the task, the control 
system does not interfere with the flow between internal and external thought content and 
therefore, off-task thoughts are not in-the-moment failures, per se (Smallwood, in press). 
The current study does not directly address the global workspace view of mind 
wandering in that all of the tasks were attention-demanding and therefore, the findings fit 
comfortably within the control failures × concerns view. 
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Implications for theories of WMC and attention control 
The current results inform functional theories of WMC that seek to identify the 
underlying factor in the relationship between WMC and higher-order cognition. Various 
theories posit executive attention (e.g., Conway, Cowan, Bunting, Therriault, & Minkoff, 
2002; Engle et al., 1999; Kane et al., 2004; Cowan et al., 2005), short-term memory 
(Colom, Rebollo, Abad, & Shih, 2006; Colom, Shih, Flores-Mendoza, & Quiroga, 2006; 
Krumm et al., 2009), and mental bindings (Oberauer, Süβ, Wilhem, & Sander, 2007; 
Wilhelm & Oberauer, 2006), as potential mechanisms. Recently, Unsworth and Engle 
(2007) demonstrated the predictive nature of secondary memory retrieval as well. 
Retrieval from secondary memory in isolation, however, is not the whole story (but see 
Mogle, Lovett, Stawski, & Sliwinski, 2008), Unsworth and colleagues argue that WMC 
relies on a controlled search of memory, emphasizing the need for attention control and 
not automatic retrieval processes (Unsworth & Engle, 2007; Unsworth, Brewer, & 
Spillers, in press). By their view, low WMC individuals use a less-constrained search set 
than high WMC individuals which results in more interference and more intrusions 
during a deliberate search for low spans. Their view, therefore, opens up a new method 
for assessing working memory (i.e., secondary memory tasks) but does not conflict with 
the executive-attention view of WMC. Only WMC theories with an attention component 
(e.g., executive-attention theory of WMC), however, predict a mediating role of mind 
wandering in the relationship between WMC and higher-order tasks. Several key findings 
from this study provide support for the executive-attention view of WMC over other, 
memory-based, WMC theories. 
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Using the attention restraint tasks (i.e., Stroop, SART, and antisaccade), I 
demonstrated the importance of attention control in the relationship between WMC and 
reading comprehension. In the SEM model (Figure 4), the relationship between WMC 
and reading comprehension was fully mediated by shared variance with the low-level 
attention tasks. The executive-attention theory of WMC predicts this mediation in that 
executive attention underlies performance on all of the tasks and drives the predictive 
abilities of WMC. The remaining variance from WMC span tasks, presumably 
accounting for the memory demands of the tasks (i.e., storage) did not predict reading 
comprehension above the variance shared with the attention-restraint tasks. If simple 
short-term memory explained the relationship between WMC and reading comprehension 
(or other complex cognitive tasks; see Colom et al., 2006), then the variance unique to 
WMC, after accounting for its shared variance with attention-restraint tasks, should drive 
the relationship with reading comprehension. This is not the case. Furthermore, the WMC 
tasks and low-level attention restraint tasks loaded significantly onto a common latent 
factor which significantly predicted reading comprehension (in part through mind 
wandering).  
Mind wandering as a significant mediator, as demonstrated here using SEM, 
provides evidence for the role of attention control in the relationship between WMC and 
reading comprehension. Neither storage views (Colom et al., 2006; Krumm et al., 2009) 
nor the mental-binding view of WMC (Wilhelm & Oberauer, 2006), whereby WMC 
predicts the ability to generate and sustain mental bindings throughout a task, predict a 
role for lapses of attention (or mind wandering) in the relationship between WMC and 
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reading comprehension. It is unclear why TUTs would be related to WMC at all based on 
the binding view of WMC. The executive-attention theory of WMC, in contrast, depends 
on two components of executive attention, goal maintenance and competition resolution, 
to explain the WMC-reading comprehension relationship. As TUTs disrupt goal 
maintenance, the fluctuations in performance as a result of TUTs should vary with WMC, 
as they do. 
Mind wandering as a mediator raises questions about long-term memory 
activation in reading comprehension. During reading, a person should use their prior 
knowledge (i.e., secondary memory) to develop situation models and draw inferences 
about the text (e.g. Singer, 1979; Singer & Kintsch, 2001). These integrative processes 
promote comprehension. Therefore, information from long-term memory is activated 
during reading (e.g., Singer & Remillard, 2004). Hasher and Zacks (1988) proposed that 
individual differences in WMC reflect the ability to successfully filter information cued 
by the text by inhibiting task-irrelevant thoughts. Unsworth et al. argue that low WMC 
individuals are less successful than high WMC individuals at constraining their search set 
during deliberate retrieval to only relevant information. In the case of reading 
comprehension, the initiation of the task goal (i.e., to understand the material) may also 
initiate a set of search constraints to filter out automatically activated but task-irrelevant 
LTM representations. Low spans may activate a greater number of associations as the 
result of a less-constrained search set and these activations, in turn, could create more 
interference to task-relevant thoughts. For example, while reading one of the Psychology 
journal articles, a high span may activate information from their previous classes to aid in 
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understanding the article. A low span, in attempting to do the same, may inadvertently 
activate a memory of a funny classmate from class using a less-refined search set. The 
memory of the funny classmate, now activated, may compete for attention with task-
relevant information and result in a TUT. Alternatively, high and low spans may activate 
the same number of LTM activations but differ in the filter between activation and 
consciousness (Hasher & Zacks, 1988). Additional evidence is needed to determine if the 
goal of reading for comprehension initiates an active search of LTM, resulting in 
different LTM activations for high and low span individuals (Unsworth et al., 2007; in 
press), or if the same LTM representations are activated only to be more easily blocked 
from awareness by high span individuals (Hasher & Zacks, 1988). The current findings 
also illuminate the importance of thought control, in addition to action control, in 
understanding the role of control processes in higher-order cognitive tasks. 
Implications for reading comprehension 
The role of mind wandering and attention control in reading is consistent with the 
Landscape model of reading comprehension (Linderholm, Virtue, Tzeng, & van den 
Broek, 2004; Rapp & van den Broek, 2005). This dynamic text comprehension model 
suggests that concepts fluctuate during reading and that the readily accessible concepts 
make up a “landscape” for the reader. Concepts are activated from the current text, 
residual activation from previous text, the memory representation of the text as a whole, 
and background knowledge activated from long-term memory. Throughout reading the 
concepts wax and wane as they are displaced, re-activated, and updated. The landscape 
model posits that reader and text characteristics, the availability of background 
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knowledge, goals and strategies, and (most importantly for our purposes), working 
memory capacity or attention control determine the activation of concepts and their 
influence on comprehension. The current study demonstrates the impact of attention 
control, in part through TUTs, on reading comprehension, as predicted by the landscape 
model. 
Previous research on the relationship between WMC and reading comprehension 
suggests that WMC impacts several parts of the reading processes, including resolving 
lexical ambiguity (e.g., Daneman & Carpenter, 1983; Mason & Just, 2007; Miyake, Just 
& Carpenter, 1994, but see also Waters& Caplan, 2004), drawing inferences (e.g., Cain, 
Oakhill, & Bryant, 2004; Linderholm, 2002; Singer, Andrusiak, Reisdorf, & Black, 
1992), monitoring or meta-awareness (Griffin et al., 2008), and ignoring irrelevant details 
(Sanchez & Wiley, 2006). Furthermore, as discussed previously, reading requires the 
activation of background knowledge from long-term memory and high and low span 
individuals may differ in their control over this search (Unsworth & Engle, 2007; 
Unsworth et al., in press) or in the ability to inhibit task-irrelevant concepts brought to 
mind (e.g., Hasher & Zacks, 1988). Which of these processes in reading does mind 
wandering disrupt? Smallwood, McSpadden, & Schooler (2008) suggest that TUTs 
disrupt the creation of a situation model for the text. In their study, subjects answered 
thought probes while reading a Sherlock Holmes story. Subjects were less likely to 
identify the villain in the story if they reported mind wandering at the beginning of the 
passage (presumably when they were to be generating their situational model) than at the 
end of the passage. The authors argue that mind wandering during specific parts of the 
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text interferes with the creation of a situation model and prevents the reader from making 
the inferences for proper comprehension. They further suggest that the control of 
attention during critical part of the text is necessary for comprehension of the story. 
Although the current study does not parse the various processes of reading and the effects 
of WMC and mind wandering on each, it does emphasize the importance of a role for 
attention control (and thought control) in theories of reading comprehension. 
Reading comprehension is a foundation of both education and job-training. The 
current study suggests that interventions meant to improve reading comprehension should 
take into account the impact of mind wandering on comprehending reading material. In 
other words, thought control, in addition to vocabulary and grammar lessons, should be a 
focus of reading training. Cromley and Azevedo (2007) conducted a study to analyze the 
contributions of several aspects of reading comprehension in order to target interventions 
on the biggest contributing factors. Their factors, background knowledge, inferences, 
strategies, vocabulary, and word reading accounted for 66% of the variance in reading 
comprehension. They did not, however, include a measure of mind wandering or any 
measure reflecting attention control (which may affect the factors they did include and 
possibly contribute unique variance). Their conclusion, to target reading comprehension 
interventions on increasing background knowledge and vocabulary (the biggest 
contributors), does not take into account the possibility that training a more basic 
attention-control mechanism should improve reading comprehension at a more global 
level than specific vocabulary or knowledge. In fact, WMC still predicts reading 
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comprehension when prior knowledge about the material is manipulated (e.g., Sanchez & 
Wiley, 2006). 
Training of working memory capacity has proven beneficial to higher-order 
cognitive tasks (Jaeggi, Buschkuehl, Jonides, & Perrig, 2008; McNab et al., 2009) and, 
based on the current findings, should improve thought control and reading 
comprehension. Several researchers have demonstrated the benefits of WMC training. 
Jaeggi et al. (2008) demonstrated an increase in the Ravens Progressive Matrices test, a 
test of Gf, as result of training over several weeks on a WMC task (n-back). Furthermore, 
McNab et al. (2009) identified a neuroanatomical change as a result of WMC training, 
potentially underlying long-term changes due to the training. After only 14 hours of 
WMC training, the density of particular dopamine receptors in regions of the brain 
associated with WMC performance increased. This suggests that this type of WMC 
training, over the course of an education program (in terms of years rather than hours) 
could drastically improve higher-order cognitions like Gf and reading comprehension. 
According to the executive-attention theory of WMC, the cause of the improvement in Gf 
and changes in dopamine receptors in the studies above is an increase in attention control 
abilities. If attention control is increased as a result of WMC training, the training is 
likely to reduce mind wandering as well, although this connection remains to be tested. 
Future Directions 
The current study and others from our lab (McVay & Kane, 2009; McVay & 
Kane, in press; McVay & Kane, in prep) have focused primarily on the “control” 
contribution of the control failures × concerns view of mind wandering. In the current 
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study, I did not control for or manipulate the presence of current concerns (i.e., the 
content of TUTs). Instead, differences in the amount or intensity of interfering thoughts 
between subjects and across task sessions is part of the error variance in these models. 
The propensity to mind wander was stable across tasks, allowing me to draw conclusions 
about the effect of individual difference in control on mind wandering. However, future 
studies should focus on the concerns component of the control failures × concerns view 
of mind wandering by addressing directly the contribution of varying levels of interfering 
thoughts. For example, a reading task could be manipulated to present more or less 
relevant personal-concerns cues within the text. This type of manipulation should reveal 
variation within subjects in the ability to maintain on-task thoughts as it would impact the 
level of interference present in the task rather than the availability of control resources. 
Conclusion 
Mind wandering mediates the relationship between individual differences in 
attention control and reading comprehension. This finding has important implications for 
our understanding of reading and its various uses in daily life. For example, education is 
largely based on the ability to comprehend written text in the form of textbooks, journal 
articles, and various other sources. This study demonstrates the interference of off-task 
thoughts on a wide range of reading tasks and furthermore suggests that individual 
differences in mind wandering is a key factor in understanding failures of reading 
comprehension. Importantly, educational plans and intervention designed to increase 
reading comprehension must not only consider language abilities (e.g., vocabulary) but 
thought control as an important contributor to errors in comprehension. 
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APPENDIX. TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
 
Table 1.  
 
Order of tasks across sessions.         
Session Tasks       
1 Ospan, Journal Article, Stroop, Maggie. 
2 Sspan, SART, War & Peace 
3  Rspan, Journal Article with probes, IVT, Antisaccade,  
  Eveline  
_______________________________________________________________________
75 
 
Table 2.  
Descriptive statistics for WMC and reading comprehension measures.    
Measure N Accuracy (SD) Skew (SE) Kurtosis (SE) 
Ospan 253 .195 (.059)* -1.213 (.153) 1.416 (.306)  
Rspan 238 .223 (.063)* -.566 (.158) -.437 (.315)  
Sspan 243 .074 (.070)* -.391 (.156) -.426 (.312)  
VSAT 223 .638 (.102) .739 (.163) .209 (.324)  
SS1 250 .731 (.148) -.281 (.154) -.511 (.307) 
SS2 240 .663 (.176) -.317 (.157) -.587 (.314) 
JA1 253 .487 (.150) -.057 (.153) -.054 (.305) 
JA2 166 .620 (.182) -.510 (.188) -.039 (375) 
W&P 247 .723 (.153) -.164 (.155) -.740 (.309) 
IVT 241 .673 (.116) .118 (.157) -.397 (.313) 
       
Note: Ospan = automated operation span task; Rspan = automated reading span task; 
Sspan = automated spatial span task; VSAT = verbal scholastic achievement test; SS1= 
first short story; SS2= second short story; JA1 = Treiman (2000); JA2 = Anastasio et al. 
(1999); W&P = War & Peace (novel); IVT = inference verification test. 
*z-score(SE)
 
                       
Table 3. Correlations and reliability for WMC, reading comprehension, attention tasks, and mind wandering measures. 
 OspanZ SspanZ RspanZ VSAT SS1 SS2 JA1 JA2 WP IVT  IncRT SART d RTsd AS Stp WP Srt            JA2 
 
SspanZ .429**                  
 
RspanZ .623** .486**                 
 
VSAT .114 .141* .246**                
 
SS1 ACC .077 .048 .199** .442** .429              
 
SS2 ACC .049 .056 .099 .355** .382** .599             
 
JA1 ACC .100 .015 .110 .224** .137* .156* .240            
 
JA2 ACC -.016 .026 .043 .467** .365** .409** .117 .565           
 
WP ACC .070 .057 .149* .484** .408** .535** .181** .444** .632          
 
IVT ACC .138* .174** .139* .468** .309** .365** .099 .505** .335** .629         
 
StpIncRT .005 -.143* -.095 -.161* -.077 -.082 -.049 -.036 -.104 -.010 .706        
 
Srt d .142* .232** .215** .159* .117 .049 .144* .016 .042 .032 .038 .872       
 
Srt RTsd -.079 -.275** -.168* -.101 -.132 -.188** -.133 -.173* -.221** -.097 .250** -.262** .859      
 
AS ACC .189** .436** .322** .285** .087 .050 .033 .177* .093 .199** -.272** .169* -.238** .885     
 
Stp TUT .034 -.102 -.033 .069 -.077 -.103 .090 -.046 -.143* -.036 .129* -.004 .124 -.100 .867    
 
WP TUT -.074 -.119 -.139* -.317** -.233** -.218** -.095 -.250** -.417** -.243** .116 -.097 .206** -.168* .346** .788   
 
Srt TUT -.132 -.044 -.082 -.002 -.026 -.117 -.010 -.133 -.085 -.096 .210** -.006 .215** -.061 .523** .312** .851  
 
JA2 TUT -.063 -.023 -.089 -.044 -.101 -.207** -.148 -.314** -.260** -.171* .019 .075 .002 -.106 .366** .392** .425**      .670 
 
Note: Values on the diagonal reflect Cronbach’s alpha for each measure as a reliability estimate; alphas were calculated over task blocks for attention tasks and mind wandering measures 
and over items for the reading comprehension measures. OspanZ = automated operation span task; RspanZ = automated reading span task; SspanZ = automated spatial span task; VSAT = 
verbal scholastic achievement test; SS1= first short story(Maggie); SS2= second short story(Eveline); JA1 = first journal article (Treiman, 2000); JA2 = second journal article (Anastasio et 
al., 1999); WP = War & Peace (novel); IVT = inference verification test; Stp = Stroop task; Inc = incongruent trials on the Stroop task; ACC = accuracy; RT = reaction time; Srt = SART 
(sustained attention to response task); d = signal detection measure of performance; RTsd = non-target reaction time variability; AS = antisaccade task. *p < .05 **p < .01 
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Table 4.  
Descriptive statistics for attention-restraint tasks.    
Variable  Mean   Standard Deviation  
  Stroop (n = 243) 
Overall ACC  .949   .074 
Incongruent ACC .887   .091 
Congruent ACC .967   .075 
ACC difference  .082   .058 
 Incongruent RT 676.924   102.219 
Congruent RT  577.280   82.793 
RT difference  99.644   48.589 
____________________________________________________________ 
  SART (n = 225)   
dL  3.385   1.705 
CL  -2.242   .535 
Target ACC  .397   .226 
Non-target RT 467.842   99.515 
Intra-subject RT SD 144.842   44.076 
____________________________________________________________ 
  Antisaccade (n= 235)   
ACC  .742   .212 
RT  453.432   108.516  
      
Note: ACC = accuracy; RT = reaction time; SART = sustained attention to response task; dL = signal-
detection sensitivity score; CL = response bias score; SD = standard deviation
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Table 5.  
Descriptive statistics for mind wandering.       
Task  N  Probes  M TUTs (SD)  
STROOP  243  36  .319 (.249) 
SART  225  36  .273 (.299) 
JA2  166  6  .379 (.228) 
War & Peace  247  20  .511 (.299) 
      
Note: TUT = proportion of task-unrelated thoughts reported on probes; SART = 
sustained attention to response task; JA2 =second journal article
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1.Confirmatory factor analysis model for the latent variables working memory 
capacity, reading comprehension, mind wandering, and attention restraint.  
Figure 2. Structural equation model depicting the relationship between working memory 
capacity and reading comprehension with mind wandering as a partial mediator. 
Figure 3. Structural equation model depicting the relationship between working memory 
capacity and reading comprehension with mind wandering as a full mediator. 
Figure 4. Structural equation model depicting the relationship between working memory 
capacity and reading comprehension with attention restraint as a mediator. 
Figure 5. Structural equation model depicting the relationship between executive 
attention and reading comprehension with mind wandering as a mediator. 
 
Figure 1. Confirmatory factor analysis model for the latent variables working memory 
capacity, reading comprehension, mind wandering, and attention restraint.
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Figure 2. Structural equation model depicting the relationship between working memory 
capacity and reading comprehension with mind wandering as a partial mediator.
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Figure 3. Structural equation model depicting the relationship between working memory
capacity and reading comprehension with mind wandering as a full mediator.
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Figure 4. Structural equation model depicting the relationship between working memory 
capacity and reading comprehension with attention restraint as a mediator.
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Figure 5. Structural equation model depicting the relationship between executive attention
and reading comprehension with mind wandering as a mediator.
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